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ABSTRACT
Although the Covid-19 pandemic that spread over the world in 2020 is 
a tragedy in terms of casualties, it is also exemplary. Exemplary, as an il-
lustration that identical policies in different contexts have varying effects 
and that contextualisation is a necessity when analysing the effective-
ness of public policies. The one-size-fits-all response from governments 
all over the world enables the investigation into the anticipated and 
unanticipated consequences of these policies within varying contexts. 
This article takes South Africa as a point of departure and compares 
the contextual features important for the Covid-19 pandemic seen in 
this country with those visible in other countries. The conclusion is that 
the worldwide responses to the Covid-19 pandemic are illustrative for 
the importance of contextual features on the varying effects of uniform 
policies. This is seen in the varying effectiveness thereof in reducing the 
spread of the virus and the fatality rate – the anticipated consequences, 
and in the varying economic, social, and political effects of the policies 
– the unanticipated consequences.
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INTRODUCTION
The year 2020 may be seen as the year in which policymaking all over the world 
was shifted to virologists. During the Covid-19 pandemic, most governments went 
to these medical experts for advice, resulting in a one-size-fits-all policy for every 
country. One problem in the recommendations that came about was that they 
were a-contextual. The general view is that, as the nature of the virus is identical 
in the United States of America (USA), Europe, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa and the rest of the world, thus the policies to contain the spread thereof 
must be identical as well, and this should result in identical outcomes. If this re-
sults in varying outcomes, for instance, if the fatality rate is less in India or Russia 
compared to the fatality rate in European countries, it must be because of poor 
statistics in those countries, the lack of testing, or unreliable measures.
In the social sciences scholars have known for a long time that analyses of 
public policies on behalf of policymakers need to be contextualised as the ef-
fects of such problems and of government actions vary depending on the struc-
tural and cultural specificities involved (Haque 1996, Bagchi 1996, Lewis 2015). 
Modern (realistic) evaluation research points out that the intended effects and the 
degree of goal achievement – anticipated effects – of policies vary under different 
contextual conditions (Pawson and Tilly 1997). In the classic view, the effects and 
side effects are perceived to be due to the contents of policies and are seen as a 
natural by-product of the goals set and the use of financial, communicative, judi-
cial, and/or institutional-organisational instruments respectively (De Vries 2016). 
The modern view is, however, that the effectiveness of policies is the result of the 
policy in interaction with contextual features.
This introduction calls for a re-assessment of theories on cause and effect, poli-
cies, and their intended effects and unanticipated consequences. The research 
presented below is based on an analysis of the policies seen all over the world to 
contain the spread of and the mortality caused by Covid-19 and argues that, first 
of all, the effectiveness of policies and their unintended consequences need to 
be contextualised.
Covid-19 has had a big impact on the world since the start of 2020. By 27 
October 2020, over 43 million people had been infected and – at a conservative 
estimation – nearly a million have died (WHO 2020a). The policies implemented 
all over the world to combat the spread of the virus were similar as most countries 
followed the recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO).
This makes the case of Covid-19 policies unique. Citizens witnessed a one-
size-fits-all public policy that countries all over the world implemented at ap-
proximately the same time. It enables an investigation of the varying anticipated 
and unanticipated consequences of the policies enacted to combat the virus in 
different contexts and different situations on the ground. Based on the above 
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background, the research is guided by the following question: What is theoreti-
cally known about the need to contextualise analyses of effects and side effects 
of public policies, and does the analysis of the anticipated and unanticipated 
effects of Covid-19 and its policy response point to the need to contextualise 
such analyses?
The next section presents a theoretical overview focusing on the theory 
regarding anticipated and unanticipated consequences and the need to contex-
tualise such effects. Subsequently, this article applies this theory to the analysis 
of the intended and unintended effects of the worldwide policies meant to con-
tain the pandemic. Lastly, a discussion and the outcomes will be provided with 
the conclusion.
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
When the first cases of the coronavirus arose at a wet market in Wuhan, China, 
few people anticipated the grave health effects it would cause all over the world 
in a short period of time (WHO 2020b). A simple analysis of the main cause 
suggested that wet markets such as those in Wuhan are dangerous, as meat is 
sold alongside live animals. This facilitates zoonotic diseases, meaning viruses are 
transmitted from animals to humans. For this reason, Wuhan authorities banned 
the trade of live animals at wet markets on 22 January 2020. The policy followed 
the basic idea that such a public policy has desirable effects and the absence 
thereof had undesirable consequences. The presence or absence of public policy 
is the cause, and the improvement or deterioration respectively in the problem-
atic situation is the effect thereof. This is the basic idea behind all public policies.
Nonetheless, the prohibition of wet markets in Wuhan could not prevent the 
spread of the coronavirus all over the world. By October 2020, more than 43 
million people had been infected and over a million people had died because 
of what then became known as Covid-19. That is according to official figures, 
which are probably inaccurate as the suspicion is that many governments tried to 
produce favourable statistics as far as possible. This is indicated, for instance, by 
the difference between the number of deaths officially due to the virus and the 
number of excess deaths – the number of people who died in a month compared 
to the average of people who died in that same month in previous years. In the 
countries that calculated such figures, the surplus deaths were sometimes 2.5 
times higher than the official figures on Covid-19 fatalities suggested.
The spread of Covid-19 was primarily conceived to be a public health issue. 
This put the virologists within the WHO as well as national virologists at the cen-
tre of delivering expertise and advice to governments, suggesting making develop-
ments in all other policy areas secondary to the common approach to limit the 
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number of deaths as a result of becoming infected. This centrality of health care 
specialists also resulted in very similar policies being opted for all over the world.
For the public, the WHO recommended policies and most governments used 
the approach of social and physical distancing, personal and respiratory hygiene, 
self-isolation, and staying informed (WHO 2020c). For governments, the main 
policies included the following: lockdowns – meaning that people were confined 
to home; closing all non-essential businesses – meaning that people had to work 
from home or became unemployed; closing all educational sectors – from basic 
schooling to universities; prohibiting large gatherings – meaning that people could 
not meet in large groups or attend mass events; regulating the mandatory use of 
face masks; and later on the tracking and tracing of contacts of infected persons. 
The specifics varied between countries as to what type of work is considered 
to be essential and non-essential, what distance is prescribed, what hygiene is 
needed, what is the maximum number of people allowed in a gathering, and 
under which circumstances face masks are mandatory. However, the nature of 
the policies was largely identical for many countries. Again, the assumption was 
that these policies – irrespective of context – would produce the desired effect of 
containing the spread of the disease. It was assumed to be self-evident that such 
policies were like medical treatments in which “it would be an absurdity to imag-
ine that the social context transforms the treatment” (Pawson and Tilly 1997:59).
However, in social science, it is widely acknowledged that this is precisely 
what happens in social programmes. In a medical perception, the underlying idea 
is that if the problem is the same everywhere, that is, the spread of Covid-19, the 
treatment should be the same everywhere, hence the one-size-fits-all solutions. 
This line of thinking ignores the growing knowledge from the social sciences that 
the effectiveness of policies is not so much due to the goals and instruments used 
in the policies, but rather due to the fit between the nature of the policy and the 
context in which it is implemented (Faletti and Lynch 2009). Faletti and Lynch 
argue “unless causal mechanisms are appropriately contextualised, we run the 
risk of making faulty causal inferences” (Faletti and Lynch 2009:1144) and that 
“causation resides in the interaction between the mechanism and the context 
within which it operates”. Pawson (2002) warned policymakers about the risk 
of mechanically transferring successful policy programmes to contexts in which 
the underlying mechanism may not lead to the same outcome (Faletti and Lynch 
2009:1151). Pawson and Tilly (1997) put it bluntly when they say, “We know that 
there are no universal panaceas and no magic bullets in the world of social and 
public programmes. Everyone understands that what works in Dulwich might not 
go down so well in Darlington, still less in Detroit”. They argue about their own 
‘realist’ approach that, “[I]n realist jargon the causal connections are established 
via ‘context, mechanism, and outcome configurations’... In the realist view, all 
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three elements must be considered in order to address the master question, ‘what 
works?’”.
The conclusion from the wealth of research on contextualisation is that the 
extent to which intended effects are achieved varies with a context defined as, 
“the relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) 
in which a set of initial conditions leads (probabilistically) to an outcome of a 
defined scope and meaning via a specified causal mechanism or set of causal 
mechanisms” (Faletti and Lynch 2009:1152).
Not investigated before is that the unanticipated consequences of public 
policies might also vary when a one-size-fits-all policy is implemented in different 
contexts. The fact that policies as a kind of purposeful action may have unan-
ticipated consequences was already addressed in 1936 by the famous American 
sociologist, Robert Merton, in one of his most cited papers, “The unanticipated 
consequences of purposive action”. Merton (1936:895) defined consequences as 
“those elements in the resulting situation, which are exclusively the outcome of 
the action, i.e., those elements which would not have occurred had the action 
not taken place” (Merton 1936:895). The author defined actions as distinct from 
behaviour as they involve “motives and consequently a choice between various 
alternatives” (Merton 1936:895). This includes public policies. Another element of 
the equation, that consequences are unanticipated, refers to those consequences 
of purposive action that are unforeseen. These can be either functional, dysfunc-
tional, or irrelevant (in Merton’s terminology, non-functional) (Merton and Merton 
1968). The authors differ from manifest functions, which are conscious and delib-
erate, while latent functions are unconscious and unintended. “Manifest functions 
are those objective consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation 
of the system which are intended and recognized by participants in the system. 
Latent functions, correlatively, being those which are neither intended nor recog-
nized” (Merton 1957:105). Because it is hardly possible to look inside the heads 
of policymakers, it is nearly impossible to tell for sure whether or not the conse-
quences were unanticipated. This research restricts such consequences to those 
effects that are not foreseen in either their direction or magnitude, and which are 
not taken into account when considering designing and/or implementing a policy.
Merton (1936:904) mentioned five causes for the occurrence of dysfunctional 
unanticipated consequences, namely limitations in the existing state of knowl-
edge; error in the appraisal of the present and future situation, including wishful 
thinking, and the refusal or inability to consider certain elements of the problem; 
economic interests in which immediate interests often dominate the consequenc-
es in the long term; basic cultural values in which the felt necessity of an action 
out of basic values precludes the consideration of further consequences; and the 
appearance of so-called self-defeating predictions, where predicting a certain 
outcome itself tends to change the initial course of developments (Merton 1936: 
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904). In those days, it was not standard to address the issue that purposeful ac-
tion can have varying unintended consequences, because of specifics in different 
contexts.
The theory resulted in much research, especially in the fields of sociology 
and public policy analysis. For scholars, the distinction between unanticipated 
consequences and intended effects is important because analysing unanticipated 
consequences implies that they search for the ‘real’ effects hidden behind ‘stated’ 
ones (Berger 1963:38). It urges scholars to advance a “debunking motif” (Ritzer 
2000). Research based on the theory of unanticipated consequences of policies 
addressed, among others, developments in bureaucracy (Scott 2013), social in-
novation (Van Wijk, Zietsma, Dorado, De Bakker and Marti, 2019), anti-gambling 
policies (Preston and Roots 2004), and drug-control policies (Chouvy 2012). As 
Bernhard and Preston (2004:1397) noted, “Merton certainly served as a founding 
figure for this tradition as he sought to separate the stated motivations behind 
policy decisions from the unintended consequences that resulted”.
Concluding, this section argued that it is relevant to examine the unanticipated 
consequences of purposive action as suggested originally by Robert Merton. 
This section also argued that policymaking as a major type of purposive action 
provides an excellent case for such analysis. This is subsequently more relevant, 
as the theories and typologies concerning policymaking as developed in the 
last decennia enable researchers to limit, specify and understand the nature of 
the unanticipated effects of policymaking. The worldwide approach to combat 
Covid-19 presents a unique case in that it is a one-size-fits-all policy applied in 
many countries under very different circumstances. The next section argues that 
the case is exemplary in showing the difficulties in making general claims about 
intended effects as well as unanticipated consequences of the problem as such, 
and the need to look for the interaction between policies and varying contextual 
features in different countries.
COVID-19 POLICIES AND THE NEED TO CONTExTUALISE 
(UN)ANTICIPATED CONSEqUENCES
This section will argue that the problem of Covid-19 is illustrative for the need 
to contextualise the varying impacts of the problem and policies in different 
countries. First, this section will address the need to contextualise the anticipated 
consequences of the problem and the policy responses. These anticipated con-
sequences are found in the spread of the virus and its fatality rate. South Africa 
is used as an example to illustrate this point. This is a country of approximately 
57 million people and witnessed its first infected patient on 1 March 2020. Two 
weeks later, President Ramaphosa declared a national state of disaster, prohibiting 
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gatherings of more than 100 people. On 18 March, schools were closed, and on 
23 March, the president announced a national 21-day lockdown to be effected on 
26 March and to end on 16 April (South African Government 2020). Exempt from 
the lockdown were:
 Q health workers, pharmacy and laboratory personnel, and emergency personnel;
 Q security services (police officers, military personnel, and private security);
 Q people regarded as necessary to the basic functioning of the economy (super-
markets, transportation and logistical services, petrol stations, banks, essential 
financial and payment services);
 Q those working in industries that cannot be economically shut down (mines and 
steel mills).
Again, this article takes the development of the problem and the policy responses 
in South Africa as the point of departure, comparing developments in South 
Africa with developments in other countries. Translating the expose presented 
in the theory section, in a simplified model concerning the pandemic and the 
responses to it, resulted in Figure 1.
The figure shows the need to contextualise all the effects. It also suggests that 
there is not only an arrow from the policy to the anticipated and unanticipated 
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Source: (Authors’ own construction)
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consequences, but also an arrow suggesting the problem itself has such effects. 
Concerning Covid-19, the effects on anticipated consequences are self-evident 
as the infectivity causes infections and fatalities, while policies are intended to 
reduce these consequences – the spread and fatalities. Next, the anticipated con-
sequences of the problem and the policies, will be explained.
Contextualising the anticipated consequences 
of the problem and the policies
Despite all the policies in place, by October 2020, the number of people in 
South Africa that tested positive was 708 000 and the number of official deaths 
due to Covid-19 exceeded 18 000 (John Hopkins University of Medicine 2020). 
The provinces with large cities were especially struggling, with one-third of the 
infected victims being inhabitants of Gauteng (Johannesburg), 18% coming from 
KwaZulu-Natal (Durban), and 17% from the Western Cape (Cape Town). Cape 
Town witnessed the start of the surge in May, the Eastern Cape and Gauteng in 
June, with other provinces experiencing an increase in July and August. At the end 
of August 2020, South Africa ranked fourth in the world in the number of infected 
persons, after the USA and three other BRICS countries – Brazil, India and Russia.
These developments can well be explained by contextual features existing in 
South Africa that worsened the consequences of the virus in South Africa. Over 
20% of its population lives in overcrowded informal settlements or traditional 
structures. Traditional structures are defined as “all dwellings constructed from 
clay, mud, reeds or other locally available materials such as huts” (Socio-Economic 
Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI) 2018:6). The United Nations-Habitat (UN-
Habitat 2006) defines informal settlements as a group of individuals living under 
the same roof who lack one or more of the following:
 Q Durable housing of a permanent nature that protects against extreme climate 
conditions.
 Q Sufficient living space, which means no more than three people sharing the 
same room.
 Q Easy access to safe water in sufficient amounts at an affordable price.
 Q Access to adequate sanitation in the form of a private or public toilet shared by 
a reasonable number of people.
 Q Security of tenure that prevents forced evictions (UN-Habitat 2006).
Furthermore, international statistics indicate that approximately 10% of the South 
African population uses open defecation, and one-quarter of the population has 
no access to basic sanitation services, including soap and water. In such a con-
text, the virus has ample opportunity to spread, no matter what measures are in-
stalled. It should be noted that these are not problems only faced by South Africa. 
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According to the UN-Stats (UN-Stats 2020) since 2018, “the absolute number of 
people living in slums or informal settlements grew to over 1 billion, with 80 
percent attributed to three regions: Eastern and South-Eastern Asia (370 million), 
sub-Saharan Africa (238 million), and Central and Southern Asia (227 million)” 
(UN-Stats 2020).
In terms of deaths caused by the virus – the fatality rate – South Africa has 
suffered less as it ranked 65th in the world at the end of August 2020, with a 
fatality rate of 2.1%, whereas this is worldwide 3.4% and in some of the hardest 
hit European countries, for example, Belgium, Spain and Italy, it even surged to 
13% (John Hopkins University of Medicine 2020). This can also be explained by 
contextual factors, in this case, demographics. South Africa has a relatively young 
population with only 5.2% of its population older than 65 years. Worldwide, the 
percentage over 65 is 7.2%; in the USA, it is over 15%; and in Europe, in many 
countries, it is well over 20% (WHO 2020d). As the virus is especially fatal for 
vulnerable, older people, this is an important contextual factor to take into ac-
count when judging the varying effects of the virus in different countries (John 
Hopkins University of Medicine 2020).
Many developing countries, including South Africa, have a low number of 
hospital beds. In South Africa, the number is two beds per 1 000 individuals, 
with one-quarter thereof being in private hospitals. To compare this, the number 
of hospital beds per 1 000 individuals in Germany is four times as high (8.3), in 
France it is 6.5, in Belgium 6.2, in Italy 3.4, and in Spain 3.0 (World Bank 2020).
If someone is infected and suffers from severe symptoms caused by the virus, 
finding a hospital bed is a necessity. The probability of being taken to a hospital 
is much lower in South Africa than in Europe or the USA. The same applies to 
intensive care units (ICUs), which in South Africa amount to 5.8 per 100 000 of 
the population, while this is 34.7 per 100 000 in the USA, 29.2 per 100 000 in 
Germany, 12.5 per 100 000 in Italy, 11.6 in France and 9.7 in Spain (McCarthy 
2020). In terms of ICUs, South Africa, however, does better than many other 
countries such as China and India with 3.6 and 2.3 ICU beds per 100 000 popu-
lation respectively (McCarthy 2020). Such contextual features can well explain 
the varying fatality rate experienced by many countries.
In light of the above, this article concludes that the emergence of Covid-19 
presents an excellent illustration of the need to contextualise the effects of global 
problems within the specifics of the national context and the situational factors 
confronting a country like South Africa, compared to other countries.
This also affects the authors’ understanding of the effectiveness of public poli-
cies and has consequences for policymakers in that they need to consider wheth-
er it makes sense to implement international recommendations into a national 
policy irrespective of the situation at hand. If one-quarter of the population lives 
in informal settlements and lacks basic sanitation or space, one can wonder about 
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the efficacy of a national approach to oblige everybody to meet the requirements 
of social and physical distancing, personal and respiratory hygiene, self-isolation, 
and staying informed. For those people living in an informal settlement, meeting 
the requirements might simply be impossible. In such a case, area-based policies 
could be more effective than housing-related measures. One could even dispute 
the need for such policies in a country like South Africa altogether, as the expec-
tation is that the achievement of intended effects would be low given the specifics 
of this country. Policies are most probably not able to contain the spread; policy-
makers could beforehand have foreseen that the fatality rate would be small given 
the age demographics and the reduction thereof due to the policies even smaller. 
Such a consideration depends, of course, also on the (un)anticipated effects of 
such policies. That is the topic to be discussed in the next subsection.
Contextualising the unanticipated consequences 
of the problem and the policies
This second part of the analysis addresses the unanticipated consequences of 
Covid-19 and the policy responses. The authors will give examples of the un-
anticipated, medical, economic, social and political consequences, to argue the 
need for contextualisation thereof.
Medical consequences
One impact of the pandemic was that it was assumed that during the lockdown, 
people with serious diseases – not Covid-19 related – hesitated to see their general 
practitioner and that general practitioners would become reluctant to see patients 
not suffering from this disease. Overcrowded hospitals would be unavailable for 
regular checks, needed surgeries, and health care appointments with patients 
suffering from diseases other than the virus. All this was said to be the cause 
of excess deaths indirectly related to the pandemic and its policy response. At 
least, that was described for developed countries in Europe. Excess deaths are 
also seen in South Africa. Researchers at the South African Medical Research 
Council (SAMRC 2020), calculated that up to August 18, there had been 39 087 
excess deaths in South Africa. Unique to South Africa is that these excess deaths 
have only been seen since the second half of June, that is, after the strictest form 
of lockdown had already ended and was eased to level 3. The South African gov-
ernment distinguishes five levels of lockdown. Level 5 is the most stringent and 
was in force in April. Important is that during this lockdown, and contrary to the 
increase in excess deaths in Europe during lockdowns, one sees negative figures 
for excess deaths in South Africa during this period. This is due, among others, 
to fewer road traffic accidents and fewer homicides. With the lowering of the 
lockdown level in South Africa, the restrictions were eased. At the time the excess 
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deaths started to rise. Although requirements regarding social distancing, wear-
ing face masks and hygiene were still in place and compulsory, this allowed the 
resumption of rail, bus and taxi services; e-hailing services; private vehicles; the 
reopening of personal care services, restaurants for ‘sit-down’ meals; accredited 
and licenced accommodation, conferences and meetings for business purposes; 
cinemas, theatres, libraries, museums, archives and galleries, casinos; and non-
contact sports (South African Government 2020).
Important for the authors’ argument on the need for contextualisation is that in 
many European countries the figures on excess deaths increased during the lock-
down and went down again after the lockdowns ended, while in South Africa, the 
surge only became apparent two to three months after the lockdown. In South 
Africa, the excess deaths as an indicator for unanticipated medical consequences 
have to be interpreted differently from those in European countries. A situational 
factor, specific for developing countries, including South Africa, explaining this is 
found in three reports. The first one is from the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), showing that the share of informal employment in South Africa is about 
35% and an additional 9.2% working in households (ILO 2018). In practice, the 
formal or informal nature of a job held by an employee is determined based on 
operational criteria such as social security contributions by the employer (on be-
half of the employee), and entitlement to paid sick leave and paid annual leave 
(ILO 2018:10). These workers are excluded from government stimulus packages 
and lose their income immediately during a stringent lockdown. Within the first 
month of the lockdown three million South Africans had lost their jobs, contrib-
uting to an increase in food insecurity and poverty. Widespread food shortages 
emerged in mid-July.
Another report showing the devastating consequences of the lockdown and 
closing all non-essential businesses is from researchers from the Stellenbosch and 
Johannesburg universities (Wills, Patel, Van der Berg and Mpeta 2020). Based on 
a survey, the authors conclude that 40% of all adults reported that their household 
lost its main source of income after lockdown started in South Africa on March 
27 and that in the two months after, 21% went hungry. Wills et al. (2020) further 
argue that despite the government’s relief package, large groups of households are 
experiencing tremendous hardship as a direct consequence of the lockdown and 
losing household income sources. It could well be that their inadequate financial 
foundation had severe consequences even when the lockdown was eased; in 
June they were still only permitted to leave their home to go to work if they had a 
permit, which people in the informal sector do not have.
Economic consequences
It is undisputed that Covid-19 and the resulting policies – especially the lockdown 
and closing of all non-essential businesses – also had economic consequences 
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and this is seen in many countries. Nonetheless, the economic impact varies 
enormously between countries. In South Africa, the government is expected to 
have a shortfall in tax revenues in 2020/2021 of R300 billion on total tax revenues 
of R1 422 billion in 2019. In April 2020, it installed first a R500 billion stimulus 
package, expanding it one week later to R800 billion. Furthermore, South Africa 
is expected to see up to a 10% contraction of the GDP, whereas the prediction in 
2019 was that GDP in 2020 would grow by 1.7% (National Treasury Republic of 
South Africa 2020).
That economic consequences vary over countries is best seen in exchange 
rates. When South Africa’s President Ramaphosa announced a national 21-day 
lockdown on 23 March, to be effective on 26 March and to end on 16 April, in 
the same week the exchange rate of the South African rand devalued compared 
to the US$ by 25% (see Figure 2).
Exchange rates are used to illustrate the impact of contextual factors as they 
vary per definition between countries. The decreasing value of one currency is the 
increase in the value of the other currency. Similar changes were seen in the other 
BRICS countries (Bank of England 2020). The Brazilian Real lost nearly half its value, 
the Russian Ruble lost 29%, the Chinese Yuan remained rather stable and devalued 
by only 2% and the Indian Rupee, devalued by 7%. This was, however, not the 
case for the Euro. This currency increased in value compared to the US$. During 
the European lockdowns in March, the value of the Euro increased by 5.6% and 
between March and August 2020, over 9% (World Bank 2020). Although Covid-19 
had a big impact on European countries, especially Spain and Italy, the effect on the 
Figure 2:  Exchange rate changes ZAR to US$ between May 2019 and August 
2020
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exchange rate compared to the international standard, the US$ was in the opposite 
direction, unlike that seen for developing countries (World Bank 2020). If changes 
in exchange rates are indicative of the national economic impact of the virus and 
the policy response to it, it is clear that these consequences vary hugely between 
countries and even more so between developed and developing countries.
Social consequences
Not all consequences of the policy responses to Covid-19 have to be seen as 
dysfunctional. As indicated already the reduction in road traffic fatalities and 
the reduced number of homicides in South Africa was positive. A positive effect 
was unexpectedly also seen in domestic, intimate and personal violence. Many 
international organisations feared that this kind of violence would increase as a 
consequence of the lockdown. The surge in domestic violence was seen in many 
countries according to the ActionAid report (2020). The ActionAid report mentions 
an increase in the calls to a national anti-violence hotline in Italy of 59% comparing 
2020 with 2019. The ActionAid report (2020) also mentions a tenfold increase in 
sexual and domestic violence in Bangladesh, a 700% increase in demand for coun-
selling services in the Gaza Strip, and a 230% increase in Greece in the call volume 
to the government hotline within one month during the lockdown. All this makes 
the organisation conclude that domestic violence has surged worldwide. Services 
across the globe are being cut or closed leaving women trapped – or forced to 
return to dangerous households (ActionAid 2020). However, such an increase is 
not the case in South Africa (Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2020a). The number 
of domestic violence cases reported to the South African police between March 
and April dropped by 69.4% (ISS 2020a). Although the validity of such figures for 
the actual frequency of domestic violence can be disputed, it can also be a conse-
quence of the peculiarities in the South African policies to combat the virus, namely 
by installing an alcohol ban. The main reason for the alcohol ban was to reduce 
the burden on trauma centres, ICU units, and hospital admissions, as many traffic 
accidents are due to alcohol abuse and violence on the streets (stabbings) is often 
related to alcohol. The alcohol ban would also have a preventive effect in comply-
ing with the requirements of social distancing, hand sanitation, and the use of face 
masks. It was anticipated that it would reduce domestic violence as well, as schol-
arly studies had pointed out that such violence is in the vast majority of cases due to 
excessive consumption of alcohol (ISS 2020a). The example shows that anticipating 
otherwise unanticipated consequences of one’s policies can reduce the magnitude 
thereof and produce positive effects.
Political consequences
The medical strains, the economic downturn, and the limitations imposed by the 
policy response to Covid-19 have caused protest demonstrations in many countries. 
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First of all, in those countries that were already heavily politicised, and in which the 
leaders were reluctant to implement the WHO recommendations (a/o. Brazil, USA). 
South Africa did not escape from such protests either. The country saw an increase 
in protest demonstrations from March 2020 onwards. These demonstrations are 
most frequent in the most populous provinces being hardest hit by Covid-19. The 
Western Cape recorded one-third of all protest action (33%), followed by Gauteng 
(27%), KwaZulu-Natal (17%) and the Eastern Cape (15%) (ISS 2020b). The number 
of protest demonstrations went up from two a day in March to eight a day in July.
Nonetheless, a survey among South Africans (Independent Polling System 
of Society (IPSOS) 2020) showed that the vast majority are satisfied with their 
government’s response to the pandemic (83% vs 17% dissatisfied). Almost all 
support the idea of requiring those with Covid-19 to remain home until they are 
well (97%); requiring those who have contact with infected people to self-isolate 
(96%); and stopping handshake/kiss greetings (95%). They also support restricting 
public gatherings, and the public health social measures: closing restaurants/night-
clubs (95%); churches and mosques; markets; closing a city off for two weeks 
(80%); closing transport between cities; and closing transport in and around cities 
(73%). Nine in 10 (93%) support school closures (IPSOS 2020). Apart from South 
Africa, the support given to different governments’ responses to the pandemic is 
shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Is your government doing a good job on containing Covid-19?
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Shown in Figure 3 is that such support varies hugely among countries. At the 
end of April 2020, only in India was a higher percentage found compared to South 
Africa, where they judged that their government had done a good job (87%). In 
France, Japan, Russia, and Italy – all hard-hit countries – a minority of respondents 
judge favourably regarding the response of their government to Covid-19.
It requires a lot of additional research to understand the peculiar finding that 
the support for the government policies is the highest in those two countries – 
South Africa and India – that were hit hardest by Covid-19 as indicated by the 
surge in the number of infections and the severity of unanticipated medical and 
economic consequences.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This article calls for contextualisation in the analysis and evaluation of public 
policies and sees the policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic as an exem-
plary case that shows why this is needed. We used South Africa as our point of 
departure. This was not only done because two out of the three authors are South 
Africans. South Africa is special in many aspects. The poverty among a large 
portion of the population, the number of people working in the informal sec-
tor and living in informal settlements, the number of unemployed, the country’s 
politicisation, the corruption, the economic downturn already visible before the 
pandemic became a reality – these factors make it a prime example to argue that 
contextualising anticipated and unanticipated consequences of public policies is 
desperately needed. The research presented in this article is explorative. It points 
to the need to do such research in a much more advanced way. This is especially 
needed because although the authors conclude that conducting such research is 
necessary, it is also full of pitfalls.
There are at least three pitfalls in such analyses, as already mentioned by Merton 
(1936). The first concerns how to ascertain that a manifest or latent outcome 
is indeed the consequence of the purposive action and can be attributed to that 
action. Merton (1936) gave two reasons for such causal imputation, namely that 
the outcome would not have occurred had the action not been undertaken, and 
second, that the supposed relation between the action and the outcome ‘makes 
sense’. Applying these remarks to the illustration of the consequences of Covid-19 
and the policy responses in South Africa shows the existence of these pitfalls. 
Perhaps it makes sense to see the devaluation of the rand as a direct consequence 
of the policies enacted, but taking a long-term perspective one could ask whether 
such a downfall would not also have occurred without the pandemic. It results in 
the question of whether the fall in the exchange rate was due to the measures en-
acted to combat the virus, would have occurred anyway, or were accelerated by 
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the pandemic. Such research remains tricky although nowadays advanced meth-
ods are available to make a convincing argument about cause and effect based 
on empirical research – experiments, statistical causal analysis, multilevel causal 
modeling, and qualitative comparative analysis. Policy analysis has also benefitted 
from advanced theories, more or less grounded in empirical research, giving the 
generative mechanisms and pointing out the specific combinations of contextual 
and instrumental variables that result in the effects. If the observer provides the 
generative mechanism between the purposive action and the outcome within the 
specific context, based on sound theorising and empirical support, causal imputa-
tions will be stronger. Nonetheless, the argument for causation cannot be proven 
and can always be contested, especially because empirically we are dependent on 
valid and reliable indicators, which are not always available.
A second issue in analysing unanticipated consequences of purposive action 
distinguishes whether these consequences are beneficial or harmful. The issue 
that arises is ‘beneficial for whom’ and ‘harmful for whom’. Merton himself dis-
tinguished between the consequences for the actor, the target group, and society 
as a whole (Merton 1936: 895). A more recent typology by Wilson about the 
distribution of costs and benefits of policies adds to this distinction (Wilson 2009; 
Knill and Tosun 2008). Wilson distinguishes between diffuse and narrowly con-
centrated benefits of a policy, and diffuse or concentrated costs involved. In the 
Covid-19 pandemic and the policy response, both benefits and costs seem dif-
fuse, but this does not prevent the policies from having severe effects, especially 
on countries and people living in countries that are already disadvantaged.
The classic view is that unanticipated consequences are due to the nature of 
the purposeful action. This goes to the heart of policymaking as the goals (pur-
poses thereof) and the instruments used to achieve those goals are seen as the 
determinants thereof. As to the goals of policies, a useful typology to distinguish 
such goals is whether the policy is meant to be regulatory – specifying conditions 
and constraints for individual and collective behaviour; distributive – providing 
resources and infrastructure; redistributive – changing the distribution of goods 
and services; or constituent – modifying procedures and institutions (Lowi 1972). 
Notwithstanding the usefulness of this distinction, the pandemic shows that spe-
cifics of the context in which goals are set and policies implemented determine 
whether regulatory goals will have unanticipated constituent, distributive, or redis-
tributive effects. It is apt to refer to Knill and Tosun, who argue that policies meant 
to be one kind of policy (regulatory or constituent), could well have unanticipated 
consequences in a completely unanticipated way, namely in their distributive and 
redistributive effects, and vice versa (Knill and Tosun 2012: 18).
Unanticipated consequences can also be the result of the instruments applied 
in a policy. Legal instruments (law making, regulations) have unanticipated conse-
quences regarding the costs of their maintenance and ensuring compliance. These 
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could also result in a changed morality not arguing that something is good or bad 
in itself, but that something is good or bad dependent on its being allowed or 
prohibited by the law. This is seen as an inferior kind of morality and as such, a 
dysfunctional unanticipated consequence (Auerbach 1983:vii; De Vries 2016:99).
The use of financial instruments – subsidies, levies, fines and rewards – is known 
for its so-called Matthew effect: “He who has shall be given”. It implies that such 
instruments are likely, but unintentionally increasing inequality as the larger part of 
subsidies is often received by groups who least need them (De Vries 2010).
The same goes for communication as a policy instrument that is known for 
producing a knowledge gap. The unanticipated consequence of information and 
communication transfer is that those people who are already well informed will 
benefit most, and such instruments increase the difference between the haves 
and the have nots.
In the response to the Covid-19 pandemic, all these instruments are used. 
There are laws and regulations installed for lockdowns and social and respiratory 
distancing. Fines are issued for violations, governments took care of ample com-
munication and informing the citizenry about developments in the spread of the 
virus and the actions taken, and at times additional hospitals were built to take 
care of those who suffered serious medical problems when becoming infected.
The basic idea is that unanticipated effects of purposive actions (policies) are 
inherent to the goals of and means used in those actions. This article went one 
step further in arguing that this is still only half the story. The context in which 
policies are designed and the goals and means applied determines the variance 
in the unintended consequences of such actions. According to the authors, the 
nature of policies might be less relevant than their fit with contextual features in 
which the action takes place.
All this results in the conclusion that it has been very dangerous to place such 
importance on the advice of virologists in policymaking all over the world as a re-
sponse to the Covid-19 pandemic. Educated in medicine, virologists were expected 
to produce a one-size-fits-all policy to be implemented in every country, irrespec-
tive of the medical, economic, social and political consequences. They could not 
have anticipated all these consequences and even less that these would vary with 
contextual variance. At the start, it was said that 2020 might be seen as the year in 
which policymaking all over the world was handed to virologists. Probably, in the 
years to come, public administrators will be asked to clean up the consequences.
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